Abstract In this paper we discuss some variations of the notion of separating code for alphabets of arbitrary size. We show how the original definition can be relaxed in two different ways, namely almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes, yielding two different concepts. The new definitions enable us to obtain codes of higher rate, at the expense of satisfying the separating property partially. These new definitions become useful when complete separation is only required with high probability, rather than unconditionally. We also show how the codes proposed can be used to improve the rate of existing constructions of families of fingerprinting codes.
Introduction
In this paper we shall proceed to relax the notion of separating code to derive two new families of codes, which we will prove to be useful in the field of digital fingerprinting.
Separating codes have been known for some decades now, being discussed for the first time by Friedman et al. [12] in the late 1960s. In those days, one of the original applications that motivated the study of separating codes was the need of an encoding scheme for the inner stable states of asynchronous automata. These states can be stored in n binary memory cells, and due to their asynchronous nature, the content of those cells are allowed to change nonuniformly in the transition between two stable states. Let a, a , b and b be the binary representations of four different stable states. A critical race occurs if in the transition from a to a , and in the transition from b to b the same intermediate state appears. Critical races are undesirable, since from that common intermediate state it is not possible to determine if the final stable state of the transition is a or b . Hence, one would like an encoding for the stable states so that any pair of "disjoint" transitions (i.e., having different initial and final stable states) shares a common intermediate state. It has been shown that separating codes provide an appropriate encoding that avoid the rise of these common intermediate states.
Codes with the separating property have also proved to be useful in many other areas, such as technical diagnosis, construction of hash functions, Internet routing, and even in genetics. Such codes have been subsequently investigated by many authors, obtaining lower and upper bounds on the code rate, and establishing connections with similar concepts. See for instance the overviews [18] and [7] .
With the advent of digital fingerprinting [3, 4] , the interest in separating codes reemerged once again. The concept of a digital fingerprinting scheme is that of traitor tracing [5, 6] applied to the distribution of digital contents. In this new area of application, separating codes are also known under the names of frameproof and secure frameproof codes [19, 20] .
A fingerprinting scheme is a cryptographic technique that enables the identification of the source of leaked information. In a fingerprinting scheme, a distributor delivers copies of a given content to a set of authorized users. If there are dishonest members (traitors) among them, the distributor can deter plain redistribution of the content by delivering a marked copy to each user. The set of all user marks is known as a fingerprinting code. There is, however, another Almost separating and almost secure frameproof q-ary codes 3 threat. If several traitors collude to create a combination of their copies, then the pirated copy that they generate will contain a corrupted mark, which may obstruct the identification of the traitors.
As stated above, the main result of this paper is the fact that relaxing the notion of separating code shall lead us to two different families of codes, coined as almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes. When absolute separation is not strictly necessary, then these two relaxations of a separating code allows us to construct codes with better rate. We will derive existence bounds for such new codes in the case of q-ary alphabets. Moreover, we will prove them to be useful to construct families of binary fingerprinting codes with efficient identification algorithms and exponentially small identification error.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the topic and present some previous results. In Section 3 and Section 4, we obtain existence bounds on the rate of the relaxed versions of separating codes that we are introducing. Next, in Section 5 we compare the obtained results with the current known state of the art. Our motivation for studying almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes is their application to fingerprinting schemes. In Section 6, we construct a family of fingerprinting codes with small error using almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Definitions and previous results
We begin our discussion by recalling some coding-theoretic definitions and some useful bounds from probability theory.
Let Q be an alphabet of size q, i.e., a nonempty set of size q. When Q is the finite field of q elements, we denote it by F q . Also, let Q n be the set of all possible n-tuples over an alphabet Q. We denote the elements of Q n in boldface, e.g., u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ). The (Hamming) distance between two elements u, v ∈ Q n is denoted d(u, v). A q-ary (n, M )-code is a subset C ⊆ Q n of size M , where |Q| = q. A code C is a q-ary linear [n, k]-code if C is a vector subspace of F n q of dimension k. The elements of a code C are called codewords. A code C has minimum distance d if d is the smallest distance between any two of its codewords. The rate of a q-ary (n, M )-code C, denoted R(C), is defined as R(C) = n −1 log q M . Informally in our discussion, we refer to a random (n, M )-code C over a q-ary alphabet Q as the result of the experiment consisting in choosing M vectors uniformly and independently from Q n . That is, we generate M codewords (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ⊆ Q n where each u i is chosen from Q independently with probability 1/q. Remark 1 A clarification is probably in order at this point. Observe that in the definition of a random code that we have just introduced, the codewords are chosen with replacement, i.e., the resulting code should be regarded as a multiset, rather than a set. Apparently, this may seem unsuitable, since the repeated codewords of a multiset should not be taken into account in the computation of the code rate. However, in our standard probabilistic analysis below, we will be interested in the occurrence of certain significant events in a random code. Namely, we will use the probability of occurrence of such significant events to show that, if they are subject to certain restrictions, then a code with some desired properties exists.
By convention in probability theory, we shall use the abbreviations "r.v." and "pmf" to denote random variable and probability mass function, respectively. Moreover, we will have several occasions to use the following well-known results. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be n independent indicator r.v.'s, i.e., taking on values in {0, 1}. Also, let X = n 1 X i , and p = EX/n, where EX denotes the expected value of X. In other words, X counts the number of successes in n trials with average probability of success p. Then, the probabilities of the tails can be bounded as
and
Here, D(x y) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two Bernoulli distributed r.v.'s of parameters x and y, respectively,
Inequalities (a) in (1) and (2) are known as the Chernoff bounds, and inequalities (b) are a special case of the Hoeffding bounds [14] . Observe that D(x y) ≥ 0, and D(x y) = 0 if and only if x = y. Moreover,
since D(x y) is strictly decreasing in the interval 0 ≤ y ≤ x. Finally, note that bounds (1) and (2) hold when X is a binomial r.v. of parameters n and p.
Separating and secure frameproof codes
Let C be a code over a q-ary alphabet Q. We call a subset of c codewords U = {u 1 , . . . , u c } ⊆ C a c-subset or a c-coalition. For a c-subset U , denote by P i (U ) the projection of U on the ith position, i.e., the set of elements of the code alphabet at the ith position,
For a pair of (disjoint) subsets U, V ⊆ C, a position 1 ≤ i ≤ n is separating if P i (U ) and P i (V ) have empty intersection. The pair of subsets U, V are separated if there exists a separating position for them. After its introduction in the work by Friedman et al. in [12] , the separating property has been investigated by many authors, e.g. in [7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18] .
In connection with digital fingerprinting, we say that a position i is undetectable for a c-coalition U if the codewords of U match in their ith position, that is, u In the field of digital fingerprinting, the marking assumption [3, 4] states that when a c-coalition U generates a forged copy of the content, the undetectable positions remain unchanged in the pirated word. For the detectable positions, the traitors are allowed to alter them in some way, possibly making them unreadable.
We will restrict our study to the so-called narrow-sense envelope model [1] . That is, we consider that the set of pirated words that a c-coalition U can generate, denoted desc(U ), is
For the binary case, and from the distributor's perspective, the study of fingerprinting codes under the narrow-sense envelope model yields the same results as the study under other envelope models, as it was shown in [1] . A pirated word z ∈ desc(U ) is also known as a descendant, and the codewords from U are also called the parents of z. Additionally, for a code C, we define the c-descendant code under the narrow-sense envelope model, denoted desc c (C), as
Thus, desc c (C) contains all vectors that can be generated by any c-coalition.
The concept of frameproof code was introduced in [19, 20] . It is easy to see that a c-secure frameproof code is the same as a (c, c)-separating code. Also, a code C such that for any c-subset U ⊆ C satisfies desc(U ) ∩ C = U is called a c-frameproof code, which is the same as a (c, 1)-separating code.
Let R sep q (n, c, c ) denote the rate of a maximal q-ary (c, c )-separating code of length n, i.e.,
where |Q| = q.
Also, consider the corresponding asymptotical rates
Lower bounds on the rate of (2, 2)-separating codes were studied in [12, 16] . Some important, well-known results for binary separating codes are worth mentioning. For example, from [16, 18] , we have R sep 2 (2, 2) ≥ 1 − log 2 (7/8) = 0.0642, which also holds for linear codes [16] . Also, for the general case, it was shown in [1] that
Regarding the upper bounds, it is known that R sep 2 (2, 2) < 0.2835 for arbitrary codes [15, 18] , and R sep 2 (2, 2) < 0.108 for linear codes [18] .
Separating and almost separating codes over q-ary alphabets
We start the study of separating and almost separating codes by obtaining lower bounds for separating codes over arbitrary alphabets. This will allow us to compare these results with the concepts of almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes that we will introduce below. We will use a standard probabilistic argument to obtain a generalization of (5).
Lower bounds on the rate of separating codes
Let us begin our discussion with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let v(j; q, c) be the pmf at j of an r.v. that counts the number of different symbols of a q-ary vector of length c chosen uniformly at random. Then,
where Proof A set of size c can be partitioned into j nonempty subsets in c j different ways. For each such partition there are exactly q(q − 1) · · · (q − j + 1) = q j possible assignments using j different elements from a q-ary alphabet. The product of these two terms gives the number of q-ary vectors of length c that contain exactly j different symbols. The proof follows after dividing by the total number of vectors of length c.
For convenience, we shall say that two q-ary vectors are disjoint if they have no common element.
q,c,c be the probability that two q-ary vectors of lengths c and c , respectively, chosen uniformly and independently at random are disjoint. Then, we have
Proof Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a c ) and b = (b 1 , . . . , b c ) be two random vectors, of length c and c , respectively, and let X be the r.v. that counts the number of different symbols in a. The probability that a and b are disjoint, i.e., {a 1 , . . . , a c } ∩ {b 1 , . . . , b c } = ∅, can be computed as
Clearly, Pr{X = j} = v(j; q, c). Also, since b has c elements, independently chosen from a, we have Pr{a and
Now, consider two disjoint subsets U, V of a random (n, M )-code C over a q-ary alphabet Q, with |U | = c and |V | = c . According to our definition of a random code, these subsets can be regarded as choosing uniformly and independently (with replacement) c and c codewords from Q n . Hence, the probability that a position 1 ≤ i ≤ n is separating, i.e.,
q,c,c . Using this fact, combined with the probabilistic argument borrowed from [1, Proposition 3.4] , it is easy to see the following result. We provide the proof below for completeness.
Corollary 1 There exist q-ary (c, c )-separating codes of asymptotical rate satisfying
Proof Let C be a random q-ary (n, M )-code, and let E be the expected number of "bad" pairs U, V of subsets with |U | = c and |V | = c , i.e., pairs that are not separated. If E < M/2, then a q-ary (n, M/2)-code with the (c, c )-separating property exists, since by removing one codeword from each bad pair, the remaining codewords yield a (c, c )-separating code. The probability that a pair U, V of such subsets is not separated is (1 − p disj.
q,c,c ) n . Hence, we have
Finally, since (
we can disregard the logarithm of this term in the lower bound on the code rate.
Lower bounds on the rate of almost separating codes
The separating property imposes a very strict combinatorial restriction to the code, namely that every pair of c-subsets is separated. One could obtain codes with better rates by relaxing this condition, and asking for codes where it is satisfied with high probability, rather than in all cases. In this section we elaborate our first proposal to relax the separating condition.
Let us introduce some useful definitions. For a code C, we say that a csubset U ⊆ C is separated if U is separated from any other disjoint c-subset V ⊆ C.
We also define the asymptotical rate of a sequence C = (C i ) i≥1 as
We are interested in estimating the maximal possible asymptotical rate, denoted R sep* q (c), among all asymptotically almost (c, c)-separating families of codes.
To derive lower bounds, we make use of a restricted version of strongly typical subsets of codewords [9] . That is, subsets of codewords that appear with high probability in a random code.
Let C be a q-ary (n, M )-code, and let U ⊆ C be a c-subset. We say that a position i is j-valued if its projection P i (U ) contains exactly j different symbols from the code alphabet. We denote N (j; U ), for 1 ≤ j ≤ min{q, c}, the number of positions 1 ≤ i ≤ n that are j-valued. then N (1; U ) = 1, N (2; U ) = 9, N (3; U ) = 5 and N (j; U ) = 0 otherwise. Note that for a c-subset U , uniformly chosen from a random q-ary (n, M )-code, the empirical distribution N (j; U )/n satisfies E N (j; U )/n = v(j; q, c),
Definition 4 Let 0 < δ ≤ 1. For a q-ary (n, M )-code C, we say that a given c-subset U ⊆ C is δ-typical if the empirical distribution of the number of j-valued positions, i.e., N (j; U )/n, is "close" to the expected value v(j; q, c) of a c-subset in a random code. Namely,
The set of all δ-typical c-subsets of a random code is denoted by A (n) δ (q, c),
Note that if U is a uniformly chosen c-subset from a random code, each N (j; U ) can be regarded as a binomial r.v. of parameters n and v(j) = v(j; q, c). Then, combining the union bound with (1) and (2), it is not difficult to see that the probability that U is not contained in the typical set satisfies
With these results in mind, we are ready to derive a lower bound for almost separating q-ary codes. The key idea in our probabilistic approach below is to bound the probability that a given c-subset is separated (from any other disjoint c-subset) in a random code, and derive the conditions on the code rate for which this probability vanishes as the code length increases.
Theorem 1
Proof Consider a random (n, M )-code C over a q-ary alphabet. For a given c-subset U ⊆ C there are exactly N (j; U ) j-valued positions. For each such position i, the probability that another random disjoint c-subset V satisfies
Pr{U and V are not separated} =
Now, using (8) and (9), the probability ε that U is not separated can be upper bounded as follows: ε = Pr{U is not separated | U is typical} Pr{U is typical}+ Pr{U is not separated | U is not typical} Pr{U is not typical} ≤ Pr{U is not separated | U is typical} + Pr{U is not typical}
Observe that taking δ = δ(n) = ln n/ √ n, then lim n→∞ ε ≤ q nA , where
Now take a sequence of codes C = (C i ) i≥1 of growing length, such that each (n i , M i )-code C i is a random code. The probabilistic argument above shows that, taking an appropriate value for δ i , for example δ i = δ i (n i ) = ln n i / √ n i , there exists a sequence of codes with lim i→∞ ε i = 0 for any rate
which completes the proof.
Almost secure frameproof codes
In this section we relax the definition of secure frameproof (i.e., separating) code, again, in order to obtain codes with better rates. The notion that we introduce here allows us to separate the concepts of almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes. Let us call a vector z ∈ desc c (C) c-uniquely decodable if z ∈ desc(U ) for some c-subset U ⊆ C and z / ∈ desc(V ) for any c-subset V ⊆ C such that U ∩ V = ∅. Note that the c-secure frameproof codes from Definition 2 can be regarded as codes where all vectors z ∈ desc c (C) are c-uniquely decodable. This alternate definition allows us to introduce the following concept.
Definition 5 A code C ⊆ Q
n is ε-almost c-secure frameproof if the proportion of c-uniquely decodable vectors among all z ∈ desc c (C) is at least 1 − ε.
A sequence of codes C = (C i ) i≥1 of growing length n i is an asymptotically almost c-secure frameproof family if every code C i is ε i -almost c-secure frameproof and lim i→∞ ε i = 0.
Consider again the asymptotical rate of a sequence of codes (7). As above, we are interested in estimating the maximal possible asymptotical rate, denoted R sf* q (c), among all asymptotically almost c-secure frameproof families. Similarly, as in Theorem 1, our approach will be to bound the probability that a given descendant is c-uniquely decodable in a random code, and derive conditions on the code rate for which this probability goes to 0 as the code length goes to infinity. Theorem 2 For the maximal possible asymptotical rate R sf* q (c) among all asymptotically almost c-secure frameproof families of q-ary codes we have
Proof Consider a random (n, M )-code C over a q-ary alphabet. Also, consider a vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) which is generated by a c-coalition U ⊆ C. For a random c-coalition V ⊆ C such that U ∩ V = ∅, using Lemma 2, we have
Certainly, there are n positions, and the probability that each position i satisfies y i ∈ P i (V ) equals p disj.
q,c,1 , because V is a random, independent coalition from U . Therefore, the probability that a given vector z ∈ desc c (C) is not c-uniquely decodable is at most
Hence, there is a sequence C = (C i ) i≥1 of growing length n i such that for each (n i , M i )-code C i the proportion of c-uniquely decodable vectors among all z ∈ desc c (C i ) is at least 1
we have lim i→∞ ε i = 0, and the proof follows.
Remark 2 If C ⊆ Q n is an ε-almost c-secure frameproof code, then for the family of codes ϕ(C), where ϕ runs over the group G of all isometries of the Hamming space Q n , the probability that any given vector z can be generated by two disjoint coalitions is at most ε (since the group G is twice transitive). This property allows us to replace the (c, c)-separating codes in the main construction of fingerprinting codes from [1] with asymptotically almost csecure frameproof families, what will result in larger code rate with the same polynomial complexity identification algorithm. See Section 6 below.
Remark 3 For the case of a family of codes (instead of a single code) we can say "probability" instead of "proportion." Namely, for every "received" vector z the probability (i.e., the "proportion" of codes) that there exist at least two different c-coalitions U, V of codewords which can generate z, is at most ε. Then, of course, for c = 2 the lower bound on the code rate is the same and it also follows from [2] .
Geometric interpretation
For an (n, M )-code C over a q-ary alphabet Q, consider the set of convex combinations between two vectors u, v ∈ C as
Note that for a c-subset U ⊆ C, its convex hull [U ] ⊆ Q n , i.e., the smallest set containing all convex combinations between any two of its elements, is precisely the envelope under the narrow-sense model, desc(U ). Therefore, for the case c = 2 and U = {u, v} ⊆ C, equation (10) For a random q-ary code C, consider the union C [c] of all points generated from c-polytopes [U ] such that U ⊆ C, as in the proof of Theorem 2. In other words, C
[c] = desc c (C). For a given z ∈ Q n and a random c-subset V ⊆ C, let us call
which follows from the proof of Theorem 2 above. Hence, the size of C [c] can be estimated as
. (11) Now, let us define the volume of C [c] by counting every point z ∈ C [c] with its multiplicity, i.e., the number of c-polytopes that contain z. Using (6), and calling v(j) = v(j; q, c), we have
This result can be obtained in two different but equivalent ways. Indeed, there are M c c-polytopes, and the probability that each z ∈ Q n is generated by a given c-polytope [U ] is g(n). Alternatively, the average number of points generated by every c-polytope [U ] can be computed as
Here, (a) is obtained by routine algebraic manipulation, and (b) follows from the well-known identity x c = j x j c j . Hence, from (11) and (12) two nontrivial observations can be drawn. First,
q,c,1 ) −n/c ), as we took in Theorem 2,
is relatively small compared to the volume of the whole Hamming space. Second, consider the average asymptotical multiplicity of the points from
.
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The last equality follows from the fact that lim n→∞ g(n) = 0. Taking again M = o(g(n) −1/c ), it is easy to see that the main part of points from C [c] have multiplicity 1, i.e., covered only once by code polytopes, which is a stronger statement than Theorem 2.
Comparison of results
In Table 1 we give some figures for the lower bounds on the asymptotical rate of q-ary separating, almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes.
It can be seen that for binary codes and c = 2 the ratio R sep* q (c)/R sep q (c, c) is about 1.6, and it approaches to 2 for c growing. That is, the lower bound on the asymptotical rate of almost separating codes roughly doubles the currently known lower bound on the asymptotical rate of ordinary separating codes. This ratio suffers from minor fluctuations, with a slight decay, for c fixed and q growing.
On the other hand, for the case of almost secure frameproof codes, the ratio R sf* q (c)/R sep q (c, c) starts at about 3.2 for binary codes and c = 2. This ratio increases significantly for c growing, and it decreases, at a much slower speed, for q growing. For example, for c = 5 and q = 3 the lower bound on the asymptotical rate of almost secure frameproof codes is about 80 times the value of the lower bound for the case of ordinary separating codes. Almost s.f. 3.783E−1 2.064E−1 1.313E−1 9.098E−2 2.572E−2 1.081E−2 Table 1 Lower bounds on the rate of some families of q-ary codes
Application to fingerprinting codes
In this section we show how almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes can be used to construct a family of binary fingerprinting codes. The contents of this section are inspired by the work presented in [1] , where the authors present a construction of a family of binary fingerprinting codes using code concatenation [11] . Their construction uses ordinary separating codes as inner codes, and the authors propose an efficient identification algorithm when the outer code is a Reed-Solomon or an algebraic-geometric code.
Our main goal is to show that replacing the inner codes used in [1] by almost separating or almost secure frameproof codes can yield a family of binary fingerprinting codes of higher rate, with a small probability of error and with an efficient identification algorithm. We will outline the family construction and derive existence conditions. Of course, in our analysis below, we will also show how to deal with the issues implied by the fact that the inner codes are relaxed versions of ordinary separating codes.
Fingerprinting codes
A collusion attack, described in Section 1, is modeled by the generation of a descendant. In this case the descendant is the word in the pirated copy and the parents are the codewords belonging to the colluders.
As it is shown in [1, 3, 4] , for a fingerprinting scheme to achieve an error probability as small as desired a single code is not sufficient, but a family of codes is needed. Below we denote a family of fingerprinting codes as C = {C j } j∈T , where T is a finite set, and each C j is an (m, M )-code. A fingerprinting scheme also has the need for randomness in the following sense. The family C = {C j } j∈T is publicly known, however, the specific code C j used by the distributor is chosen at random with probability π(j), and it is kept secret.
For the family of fingerprinting codes C = {C j } j∈T we also need an identification algorithm, which is a collection of functions A = {A j } j∈T , where each A j is a map from the set of descendants of C j to the subsets of codewords of C j of size at most c,
Definition 6 Let T be a finite set and let π be a pmf on T . For c ≥ 2, a family of fingerprinting codes C = {C j } j∈T , is c-secure with ε-error if there exists an identification algorithm A = {A j } j∈T that satisfies the following condition: if a coalition U of size at most c creates a descendant z, then A j (z) is not empty, and
where the probability is taken over the random choices made by the coalition when creating the descendant, and over the pmf π.
Family construction and existence conditions
Let C out be an (n, M )-code over a q-ary alphabet Q, and let C in be a binary (l, q)-code. Consider a vector mapping (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ), where φ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n are bijections between Q and C in . It is clear that there are (q!) n different such vector mappings. If the mappings are arbitrarily numbered from 1 to (q!) n , then
denotes the mapping indexed by t. Now, for w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ C out , we denote by Φ t (w) the following binary vector of length m = n l:
Construction 1 (Family of binary concatenated codes) Let C out be an (n, M )-code over a q-ary alphabet Q (the outer code), and let C in be a binary (l, q)-code (the inner code). Also, let Φ t denote the mapping indexed by t as in (13) . Denote by C t the binary (m, M )-code, with m = n l, constructed in the following way:
The set C = {C t } t∈T , with T = {1, . . . , (q!) n }, constitutes the family of binary concatenated codes.
Taking into account Definition 6, to use the family from Construction 1, C = {C t } t∈T , first we have to choose a value t ∈ T according to a pmf π(t). This value t must be kept secret. Each user is then assigned a codeword from C t , and the copies of the content are delivered correspondingly marked.
Let U = {u 1 , . . . , u c } ⊆ C t be a c-coalition, and W = {w 1 , . . . , w c } ⊆ C out be the subset of the corresponding codewords of the outer code. In other words,
be a descendant created by coalition U . In the discussion of the identification algorithm, we will consider that the identification process of each inner block z i returns a set V i ⊆ C in of at most c codewords, such that z i ∈ desc(V i ). Observe that if the inner code C in is an ε in -almost (c, c)-separating or an ε in -almost c-secure frameproof code, then with probability ≥ 1 − ε in there is a v ∈ V i such that v agrees with the ith block of a traitor codeword, i.e., v = φ ti (w i ) for some w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ W .
We now state, in the form of a theorem, the precise parameters of the family of codes from Construction 1 so that it can achieve exponentially small error probability when used in conjunction with Algorithm 1. Besides Reed-Solomon codes, algebraic-geometric codes are also proposed as outer codes in [1] . As noted in Section 5, replacing ordinary separating codes by almost separating or almost secure frameproof codes enables us to increase the asymptotical rate of the family of fingerprinting codes proposed in [1] , while maintaining an exponentially small identification error.
Considering the assumptions of Corollary 2, the decoding process of a single inner code made in Step 1a) of Algorithm 1 takes time O(l n c ) in the worst case. That is, the overall decoding time for the whole set of inner codes is O(l n c+1 ). Moreover, we would like to stress that the main reason for Construction 1, Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 is to mimic the following strategy from [1] . If the outer code C out is a Reed-Solomon or an algebraic-geometric code, then Steps 3) and 4) can be efficiently done in O(poly(n)) by using the list decoding algorithms from [13] . Therefore, traitor identification can be efficiently achieved in polynomial time in the code length.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented two different relaxed versions of separating codes, namely almost separating and almost secure frameproof codes. The notions introduced allows us to separate two concepts that coincide in the case of absolute separation.
To show existence bounds for almost separating codes we have used the concept of typicality. Our analysis is based in the fact that a typical set of at most c codewords is separated, with very high probability, with all other disjoint sets also of at most c codewords. This analysis shows that there exists almost separating codes that double the asymptotical rate of ordinary separating codes.
For almost secure frameproof codes the probabilistic analysis shows that there exist almost secure frameproof codes with asymptotical rate even higher, with relative difference to the rate of both separating and almost separating codes increasing with the coalition size.
We believe that these two notions are essentially different, in particular, we conjecture that for asymptotical rates but it could be a rather difficult question since even for the simplest case q = c = 2 the best upper bound for the rate of (2, 2)-separating codes R sep 2 (2, 2) ≤ 0.2835 is very far from being "useful."
Finally, we have presented a construction of a family of fingerprinting codes. The use of almost separating or almost secure frameproof codes as inner codes allows us to obtain better code rates, preserving the exponential decline of the error probability on the outer code length, and it also enables us to obtain a polynomial-time identification algorithm.
